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THE OREGON APPROACH TO POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF
I. INTRODUCTION
Without applauding or disparaging their validity, but taking
them as facts of post-conviction-remedy-life, the recent United States
Supreme Court decisions seem to reduce the question as to what post-
conviction procedure we must have to an inquiry as to what kind of
a role "we" desire the federal judiciary to play in the state criminal
process. Although Case v. Nebraska1 conveys the hope that the
administration of criminal justice can remain almost exclusively a
state matter, if the several states refuse to acknowledge the federalism
aspect of our system of laws in the criminal law field, we may see
increased participation by the federal district courts in state criminal
procedure. The concurring opinions in Case make it clear that inde-
pendence will not be tolerated if states fail to recognize and embrace
without defiance the dictates of the fourteenth amendment as part of
their criminal codes.'
Although Case specifically declined to consider what constitutes
fair and just state post-conviction procedures under the fourteenth
amendment, recent decisions viewed in light of Case provide clues as
to what the Supreme Court of the United States will likely require.
The implications of Townsend v. Sain,5 for example, suggest that state
post-conviction procedures should provide a full and fair evidentiary
hearing on all claimed deprivations of constitutional rights. While the
transcript of trial should carry a presumption of validity, it should
not be irrebuttable. Townsend further suggests that state court deci-
sions include specific and explicit findings of fact, fairly supported by a
complete and reliable record of the hearing as well as the conclusions
of law derived from those findings. Again, with Case in mind, Fay v.
Noia4 and Douglas v. Alabama' strongly warn the states to apply the
doctrine of waiver narrowly in favor of the defendant. Henry v.
Mississippi' makes clear that a forfeiture of a constitutional right
1 381 U.S. 336 (1965). The concurring opinion of Mr. justice Brennan states at 344:
Our federal system entrusts the States with primary responsibility for the
administration of their criminal laws. The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Supremacy Clause make requirements of fair and just procedures an integral
part of those laws, and state procedures should ideally include adequate admin-
istration of these guarantees as well.
2 Ibid.
3 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
4 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
5 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
6 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
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because of a procedural default must be justified by an overriding
legitimate state interest. Sanders v. United States' clearly limits the
application of res judicata when a defendant has not been afforded an
opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing at which he is represented
by counsel, and where all his constitutional claims were not or could
not have reasonably been presented and decided on the merits. Finally,
the obvious lesson of Gideon v. Wainwright' is that a post-conviction
remedy should provide court-appointed counsel for those financially
unable to retain their own.
Fair inferences from the above cases justify the assumption that
any adequate post-conviction remedy should: (1) provide a full and
fair evidentiary hearing; (2) apply doctrines of waiver and for-
feiture strictly in favor of the defendant; (3) apply res judicata only
when claimed deprivations of constitutional rights have been or could
reasonably have been adjudicated on their merits after an evidentiary
hearing; (4) provide for the assistance of counsel; and (5) require the
court's decision to explicitly state the specific findings of fact fairly
supported by the record and the conclusions of law derived from
those findings. With these criteria in mind, this comment shall ex-
amine one state's attempt to fulfill its primary responsibility for the
administration of its criminal laws. That state is Oregon whose Post-
Conviction Hearing Act became effective on May 26, 1959.9
II. RELIEF AVALABLE PRIOR TO THE ACT
A. Habeas Corpus
In order to understand the purpose and impact of the Post-Con-
viction Hearing Act, it is necessary to describe and analyze the modes
of relief available prior to its enactment. Prior to 1959 there existed
four kinds of post-conviction remedies in Oregon. The first and most
effective was habeas corpus. It was guaranteed by the Oregon Con-
stitution 0 and implemented by statute. 1 It provided a means of at-
tacking the judgment by which the petitioner was imprisoned on the
grounds that the sentencing court had neither jurisdiction of the
person nor of the subject matter. This common law interpretation of
habeas corpus was expanded in Huffman v. Alexander,'2 where it was
held that a court could lose personal or subject matter jurisdiction by
denying an accused his constitutional rights during the trial. The loss
7 373 US. 1 (1963).
8 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
0 Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 34.330, 138.500-.680 (1963).
10 Ore. Const. art. I, § 23.
11 Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 34.310-.730 (1963).
12 197 Ore. 283, 251 P.2d 87, rehearing denied, 253 P.2d 289 (1953).
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of jurisdiction would thus render the conviction void.'" In addition,
only those illegally restrained could avail themselves of the writ.'4
Further, recitals in a judicial record were deemed to be absolutely
true and could not be directly controverted by extrinsic evidence
unless the claim of the petitioner went to the narrow question of per-
sonal or subject matter jurisdiction."5 Although the habeas petitioner
had a right of appeal, he did not have the right to court appointed
counsel on appeal.' 6 Since habeas corpus was a collateral attack on
the judgment,17 it was not a substitute for appeal and any noncon-
stitutional errors or irregularities which could have been corrected on
appeal were not grounds for relief, if they merely made the judgment
voidable.'" Failure to assign as error on appeal or to make an excep-
tion in the trial court resulted in the waiver of any claim the habeas
petitioner might otherwise have had.'9 Finally, res judicata applied to
habeas corpus decisions with the result that any denial of the writ
precluded a subsequent application for habeas corpus relief not only
upon the grounds alleged, but also upon grounds which could have
been alleged in the prior habeas proceeding."
B. Coram Nobis
The second most important post-conviction remedy, although
quite a latecomer, was coram nobis or more correctly, a motion in the
nature of coram nobis. This remedy was not provided by statute but
was a common law writ recognized in a very limited form by the
Supreme Court of Oregon in State v. Huffman.2' Before Huffman,
coram nobis had come to the attention of the court only twice,22 and
then in cases which did not decide if this remedy was available in
'3 Smallman v. Gladden, 206 Ore. 262, 291 P.2d 749 (1956).
14 Huffman v. Alexander, supra note 12, at 318-19, 251 P.2d at 102-03. See also
Anderson v. Britton, 212 Ore. 1, 5, 318 P.2d 291, 293 (1957); White v. Gladden, 209
Ore. 53, 303 P.2d 226 (1956); State v. Huffman, 207 Ore. 372, 384, 297 P.2d 823, 836
(1955).
15 This is the historical view taken by the Supreme Court of Oregon in Huffman v.
Alexander, supra note 12, at 314-21, 251 P.2d at 101-04.
16 State v. Delaney, 221 Ore. 620, 332 P.2d 71 (1960).
17 Anderson ex rel. Poe v. Gladden, 205 Ore. 538, 544, 288 P.2d 823, 826 (1955).
18 Smallman v. Gladden, supra note 13, at 269-70, 291 P.2d at 752-53.
19 Anderson v. Britton, supra note 14, at 7, 318 P.2d 294; Huffman v. Alexander,
supra note 12, at 296, 251 P.2d at 92-93.
20 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 34.710 (1963) ; Barber v. Gladden, 215 Ore. 129, 136, 332 P.2d
641, 644 (1958).
21 Supra note 14.
22 Huffman v. Alexander, supra note 12; State v. Rathie, 101 Ore. 368, 200 Pac. 790
(1921).
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Oregon. In Huffman v. Alexander 3 the court expressed confusion over
the existence of coram nobis, but went on to say it was in the nature
of a motion for new trial and the only relief which it afforded was the
setting aside of the judgment of conviction and the granting of a new
trial. Although intimating there was no right of appeal from an adverse
ruling in the trial court, it was not until State v. Endsley2 4 that the
Supreme Court of Oregon finally determined it had no appellate
jurisdiction in coram nobis. Since this remedy only came to the
forefront some three years before the new act, there is very little
case law indicating its exact scope. However, State v. Huffman,2 5
while not specifically so holding, strongly implied in dicta that coram
nobis was available to attack a void judgment in the convicting trial
court only when no other adequate remedy existed. This was a result
of the common law theory that coram nobis was part of the original
proceeding similar to a motion to set aside or to vacate.26 Probably the
most significant aspect of this remedy was its supposed availability
to a petitioner whether imprisoned or not. State v. Huffman27 appeared
to say, that if the petitioner was not imprisoned, coram nobis would
provide relief only if, under state or federal law, further penalties or
disabilities could be imposed because of a prior conviction. This be-
comes important under an habitual criminal statute where an accused
may be given an enhanced sentence for his latest conviction because he
has accumulated previous convictions. Although there was no time limit
for bringing an action in coram nobis, a doctrine similar to laches would
likely have been used. 8
C. Motion to Correct the Record and Motion to Vacate
As an adjunct to habeas corpus and probably as a result of the
latter's rule against direct contradiction of the record, there existed
a third post-conviction remedy. This was a motion to correct the
record. It was available only if the motion's purpose was to have a
court determine whether constitutional requirements had been violated
at trial and such were in contradiction of the record. 29 The very limited
scope of the motion to correct the record made it a little used remedy.
23 Supra note 12, at 338, 253 P.2d at 292.
24 214 Ore. 537, 331 P.2d 338 (1958).
25 Supra note 14, at 391, 297 P.2d at 839.
26 See State v. Endsley, supra note 24.
27 Supra note 14, at 417, 297 P.2d at 851.
28 Id. at 419, 297 P.2d at 852.
29 State v. Sherwood, 214 Ore. 594, 597-98 (1954) (opinion subsequently withdrawn
for lack of appellate jurisdiction).
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There was no right of appeal from a judgment on a motion to correct
the record.30
A motion to vacate was the only other post-conviction remedy
available and then only during term.3 In the absence of statutory
authority the Supreme Court of Oregon had no appellate jurisdiction
over a motion to vacate under the doctrine of State v. Endsley.32
It is obvious that Oregon, like so many other states, was confused
as to what post-conviction procedures it had, their nature, and the
relief which could be afforded under them. Even a cursory reading of
the ten leading cases3" decided between 1951 and 1959 indicates the
problems the Oregon courts faced in trying to provide some kind of
adequate post-conviction remedy.
One further difficulty was added by Griffin v. Illinois3 4 since the
Oregon statutes lacked any provision for the payment of costs of
transcripts and the fees of counsel for an indigent on appeal under
existing post-conviction remedies. 5
With this background, we can now proceed to an analysis of the
act itself and its case law interpretation."3
III. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE ACT
A. Introduction
The purpose of the act has been expressed by the Supreme Court
of Oregon as follows:
The Post Conviction Hearing Act was enacted by the legislature to
eliminate the confusion that had arisen over the use of various com-
mon law remedies to challenge the lawfulness of a person's convic-
tion of crime and to provide a single and exclusive proceeding
whereby the convicted person might challenge the lawfulness of the
proceedings which led to the judgment pronounced by the trial
court. The legislature, however, did not abolish the ancient writ
30 Id. at 600.
81 Gladden v. Kelly, 213 Ore. 197, 199-200, 324 P.2d 486, 487-88 (1958).
32 Supra note 24.
33 Barber v. Gladden, supra note 20; State v. Sherwood, supra note 29; State v.
Endsley, supra note 24; State v. Brooks, 214 Ore. 535, 331 P.2d 343 (1958); Gladden v.
Kelly, supra note 31; Anderson v. Britton, supra note 14; State v. Huffman, supra note
14; Smallman v. Gladden, supra note 13; Poe v. Gladden, supra note 17; Huffman v.
Alexander, supra note 12.
84 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (appellate review cannot be denied solely on basis of lack of
funds to procure transcript).
35 See Townsend v. Sain, 372 US. 293 (1963).
36 For further discussion of the act's history, see Collins & Neil, "The Oregon Post-
Conviction Hearing Act," 39 Ore. L. Rev. 337, 340 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Collins
& Neil].
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of habeas corpus. This is especially retained in criminal cases where
the prisoner challenges his restraint upon grounds that do not
challenge the lawfulness of the proceedings. 37
The Oregon Constitution guarantees the remedy of the writ of
habeas corpus to a person illegally restrained of his liberty.38 That
document also confers concurrent original habeas corpus jurisdiction
in the Supreme Court of Oregon.39 Since the legislature could not
abolish habeas corpus, it was forced to make the scope of the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act at least as broad as habeas corpus prior to
1959.40 The need to provide a single remedy responsive to the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States obviously moved the
legislature to make available in one procedure all previously existing
post-conviction remedies. Consequently, the influence of habeas corpus,
coram nobis, and the motions to correct the record and to vacate the
judgment is apparent throughout the new act.4 '
An examination of this act must begin with an understanding of
the new role of habeas corpus. All other remedies were abolished.42
Habeas corpus was limited in availability to provide relief only in
situations not covered by the act.43 Subsections 138.540(1) and (2)
make clear that the act neither provides a remedy for illegal pre-con-
viction restraint nor illegal restraint which does not affect the validity
of the judgment of conviction. Nor does it provide a remedy for non-
criminal cases of illegal restraint. Illegal revocation of parole or
conditional pardon and completion of sentence are examples of illegal
restraint after conviction which do not challenge the validity of the
judgment and for which habeas corpus is the proper remedy.44 Ex-
amples of pre-conviction restraints which do not challenge the validity
of the conviction or sentence for which habeas corpus is again the
proper remedy include the custody of children and restraint in a
mental institution.45 In other words, if the petitioner can admit the
37 Strong v. Gladden, 225 Ore. 345, 348, 358 P.2d 520, 521 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
38 Ore. Const. art. I, § 23.
39 Ore. Const. art. VII, § 2.
40 Ore. Rev. Stat. 138.530(2); see Collins & Nell at 346.
41 The act's authors state that the legislature assumed the new act would be inter-
preted with the aid of the new abolished remedies and habeas corpus. Collins & Neil at
337-38.
42 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.540(1) (1963).
43 Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 34.310, 34.330(3) (1963).
44 Ore. Rev. Stat. 138.540(2) (1963). See Fredricks v. Gladden, 211 Ore. 312, 315
P.2d 1010 (1957); Anderson v. Alexander, 191 Ore. 409, 229 P.2d 633, rehearing denied,
230 P.2d 770 (1951).
45 Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 34.310, 34.330(3) (1963). See also Collins & Neil at 343.
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validity of his conviction and sentence and is still illegally restrained
of his liberty, then habeas corpus is the proper remedy.46
B. Proper Standing to Invoke the Act
The first sentence of Oregon's Post-Conviction Hearing Act be-
gins: "Any person convicted of a crime under the laws of this state
. . . .47 Such person is eligible to file a petition for relief. The act
provides special venue for petitioners not imprisoned48 and precludes
the complaint from being moot as a result of the release, parole, or
conditional pardon of a petitioner during the pendency of proceedings
under the act.49 Consequently, parolees 0 and persons having served
their sentences 51 are eligible to proceed under the post-conviction
remedy statutes. 2 As previously noted,53 coram nobis was available to
persons not in confinement as a means of attacking a void judgment.
If the prior law under coram nobis can be taken as a guide, State v.
Huffman5= 4 would indicate that a person not imprisoned could attack
a judgment of conviction if, under state or federal law, further
penalties or disabilities could be imposed upon the petitioner because
of the existing judgment. Hence, it is probable that a person in prison
could attack his present habitual criminal sentence by attacking the
validity of a previous conviction, the sentence for which has already
been served." In the only reported case since the act became effective
in which the question was raised, the Supreme Court of Oregon ex-
pressly declined to answer the question and rested its decision on other
grounds.56 Nevertheless, recidivists may attack their enhanced sen-
46 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 34.310 (1963). See, e.g., Strong v. Gladden, 225 Ore. 345, 358
P.2d 520 (1961).
4 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.510 (1963).
48 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.560(1) (1963).
49 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.560(3) (1963).
50 See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 233 Ore. 459, 378 P.2d 951 (1963).
51 See, e.g., State v. Huffman, supra note 14.
52 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.510(3) (1963) explidtly provides relief for persons con-
victed before the act's effective date of May 26, 1959, irrespective of when the petition
is filed.
53 See text accompanying note 27 supra.
54 Supra note 14.
55 Ibid.
56 In Bevel v. Gladden, 232 Ore. 578, 580, 376 P.2d 117, 118 (1962), the petitioner
questioned the validity of a 1955 conviction the sentence for which had been served.
He argued that the 1955 conviction being void could not be considered in imposing an
enhanced sentence under the habitual criminal statutes. Since petitioner had compiled
enough other valid felony convictions to warrant the enhanced penalty, the Supreme
Court of Oregon upheld the validity of his habitual criminal sentence.
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tences 7 and it is extremely likely that they will be able to do so by
attacking a previous conviction even though that sentence has been
served. 8
The act59 specifically permits a petition for relief to be filed
at any time,"0 i.e., any time after conviction."' Since a proceeding
under the act is a collateral attack on the judgment and sentence,62 all
procedures for direct attacks on the judgment of conviction must be
unavailable at the time a petition is filed under the act.63 A motion
for new trial, a motion in arrest of judgment, and direct appellate
review are still a part of Oregon's post conviction procedures and their
availability precludes relief under the post-conviction remedy act.6 4
The act also6" demands that subsection 138.540(1)'s exhaustion re-
quirement be interpreted to mean that post-conviction relief is not
available if either direct appellate review, a motion for new trial, or
a motion in arrest of judgment are available at the time a petition for
post-conviction relief is filed. This is similar to the exhaustion require-
ment of federal habeas corpus as interpreted in Fay v. Noia.66 Peti-
tioner's failure to appeal or to avail himself of motions in arrest of
judgment and new trial, however, does not bar him from post-con-
viction relief."
Although more directly related to the grounds upon which post-
conviction relief is available, subsection 138.540(2) is a corollary to
57 See, e.g., State v. Cloran, 233 Ore. 400, 377 P.2d 911 (1963).
58 At this point it is interesting to reflect on the act's ramifications for a recidivist
of the recent case of State v. Latta, - Ore. -, 405 P.2d 367 (1965). The defendant
had been convicted of carrying a concealed weapon under a special statute applying only
to former convicts. Latta's only previous conviction was erroneously declared void and
set aside in a post-conviction remedy proceeding. Neither the parties nor the Supreme
Court of Oregon denied that the judgment in the post-conviction proceeding was erro-
neous and that actually the previous conviction had been valid. However, the State
failed to appeal and, erroneous or not, the judgment declaring the first conviction void
became res judicata against the State. Latta could not therefore be considered a former
convict. Consequently, Latta could not be convicted under the special statute prohibiting
former convicts from carrying concealed weapons.
9 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.510(2) (1963).
60 See, e.g., Tuel v. Gladden, 234 Ore. 1, 379 P.2d 553 (1963), in which the petition
was filed thirty years after conviction.
61 Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 34.310, 34.330, 138.510, 138.540(1), 138.540(2) (1963).
62 State v. Cloran, supra note 57; Brooks v. Gladden, 226 Ore. 191, 358 P.2d 1055
(1961).
63 The act is not a substitute for appeal. State v. Cloran, supra note 57.
04 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.540(1) (1963).
65 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.550(1) (1963).
66 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
67 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.550(1) (1963). See, e.g., Barnett v. Gladden, 237 Ore. 76,
390 P.2d 614 (1964); Brooks v. Gladden, supra note 62.
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the exhaustion requirement and is used to determine when post-convic-
tion relief is available to a person convicted of a crime. If the claim of
illegal restraint does not call in question the soundness of the judg-
ment or the proceedings leading thereto which would render the
judgment void, habeas corpus is then the only proper remedy.
C. Grounds Available for Relief
1. Meaning of "Substantial Denial"
The heart and substance of Oregon's Post-Conviction Hearing
Act is subsection 138.530(1), which provides the grounds for relief,
and section 138.550, which injects the much sought after finality to
the criminal process by its strict and extensive res judicata and waiver
provisions. Subsection 138.530(1) delimits the scope of the act, but
its scope cannot be fully appreciated without a consideration of the
limiting effects of res judicata and waiver. For purposes of discussion,
however, grounds for relief and res judicata and waiver will be treated
separately.
If, at an evidentiary hearing,6" petitioner proves facts by a pre-
ponderance of evidence 9 establishing "a substantial denial in the
proceedings resulting in . . . conviction, or in the appellate review
thereof, of petitioner's [constitutional rights] and which denial ren-
dered the conviction void, ' 70 then he has an absolute right to relief.7 '
The term "substantial denial" was borrowed from the Illinois post-
conviction statute to indicate that relief should not be granted because
of non-prejudicial technical errors.72 This indicates the legislature
was of the opinion that a defendant could be denied a fourteenth
amendment due process right for which he could not claim relief under
the act, if the denial was not substantial. It left to the courts the job
of determining which violations of constitutional rights were serious
enough to warrant relief.73 Although it was almost two years after the
enactment of the statute, the Supreme Court of Oregon in Brooks v.
Gladden74 interpreted the meaning of "substantial denial" to mean
simply, a denial of due process.
The petitioner in Brooks"5 specifically relied on subsection 138.530
68 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.620(2) (1963).
69 Note the influence of the civil nature of common law habeas corpus.
70 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.530(1)(a) (1963).
71 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.520 (1963).
72 Collins & Neil at 345. For a discussion of the Iinois statute, see Comment, 27
Ohio St. L.J. 244 (1966).
73 Ibid.
74 Supra note 62.
75 Supra note 62.
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(1) (a)'s "substantial denial" and the question thus presented was
"whether the right of the accused to poll the jury is so essential in
assuring him a fair trial that the refusal to permit the poll is a
'substantial denial' of a fundamental right protected by the Consti-
tutions .... "I' The court noted that subsection 138.530(l) (b) stated
the traditional grounds for habeas corpus relief and that the scope
of the writ had been extended to cases "where the trial court had
initial jurisdiction but lost it by departing from due process of law,
thus rendering the judgment void."" By thus using subsection (1) (b)
to interpret subsection (1) (a), the court concluded that (1) (a) stated
the essence of the grounds for relief under the expanded habeas
corpus and that a simple denial of due process qualified the petitioner
for relief.7 8 It is at this point that the court, consciously or un-
consciously, deviated from the meaning of "substantial denial" in-
tended by the legislature.
The court stated: "Petitioner, to qualify for post-conviction relief
on this ground [subsection 138.530(1)(a)'s substantial denial] has
the burden of showing that he has been denied due process of law.79
It should be noted that as expressed in this quotation, the word "sub-
stantial" is left out, arguably meaning that any denial of due process
is ground for relief. The court went on to examine the question pre-
sented in terms of expanded habeas corpus beginning with the
cautionary rule that its expansion did not convert that remedy into a
method of appealing the conviction 0 and that habeas corpus was not
a substitute for the writ of error.81 This rule calls into play the distinc-
tion between appeal and habeas corpus. The distinction, aptly illus-
trated in Brooks, rested on a determination of whether the claimed
irregularity in the trial procedure was merely an irregularity of such
stature as to make the trial of an accused fall below the minimal stan-
dards of due process.8"
In deciding petitioner's question, the court reviewed numerous
federal, Illinois, and Oregon cases which support the distinction be-
tween nonconstitutional error and denial of due process. Finding
nothing on the right to poll a jury, the court defined due process as
76 Brooks v. Gladden, supra note 62, at 194-95, 358 P.2d at 1057.
77 Ibid. The court cites Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Ore. 283, 313-14, 251 P.2d 87,
100-01 (1952), rehearing denied, 253 P.2d 289 (1953).
78 Brooks v. Gladden, supra note 62, at 195-96, 358 P.2d at 1058.
79 Ibid. (Emphasis added.) The court cited Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 274-75
(1945); Smallman v. Gladden, 206 Ore. 262, 269-70, 291 P.2d 749, 752-53 (1956).
80 Brooks v. Gladden, supra note 62, at 196, 358 P.2d at 1058.
81 Id. at 197, 358 P.2d at 1058.
82 Smallman v. Gladden, supra note 79, at 269-70, 291 P.2d at 752-53.
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that which constitutes the contemporary attitudes of fair play in the
legal process.3 The court then proceeded to decide that the erroneous
denial of the right to poll a jury is not such an exceptional circumstance
as to be a denial of due process. The court buttressed its decision by
stating that the "error" could havte been redressed on appeal.84
Wittingly or unwittingly, the court in Brooks, by equating "sub-
stantial denial" with "denial of due process of law," sufficiently
emasculated the word "substantial" to effectively read it out of sub-
section 138.530(1) (a). Brooks is the leading case interpreting the
grounds for relief under the act; the tests it set forth have been
consistently followed. If error was committed, relief is available only
on appeal. If a denial of due process is committed, relief is available
under the act as well. There seems to be no intermediate ground where
the irregularity is a denial of due process, but not of such significance
to warrant post-conviction relief. Rather, "substantial" seems to have
been used to describe "error" in order to determine when such could
be classified a denial of due process.
In a case where the determination of whether or not the defendant
has been denied due process of law depends upon an inextricable
tangle of law and fact, the element of "substantial" could be a decisive
factor. On the other hand, there remains the question of whether or
not relief for only a substantial denial of due process instead of any
denial constitutes adequate relief. The Supreme Court of Oregon may
have effectively precluded the presentation of this question to the
federal courts thereby increasing the finality of its own criminal process.
The concluding phrase of subsection 138.530(1), "which denial
rendered the conviction void," was added at the request of the Attorney
General of Oregon to invoke the precedents in habeas corpus as guide-
lines in interpreting "substantial denial."8 5 Whether or not this was
intended to help make the Post-Conviction Hearing Act more liberal
than habeas corpus did not make much difference after Brooks. Not-
withstanding that error does not constitute grounds for relief under
subsections 138.530(1) (a) and (b) of the act; the phrase does incor-
porate into subsection 138.530(1) the expanded concept of habeas
corpus.8 6 The morq significant relevance of this phrase turns out to be
something the drafters probably did not contemplate, but is more ap-
propriately included in the discussion of section 138.520 on relief.
83 Brooks v. Gladden, supra note 62, at 199, 358 P.2d at 1059.
84 Id. at 203-05, 358 P.2d at 1061-62.
85 Collins & Nell at 345.
86 Brooks v. Gladden, supra note 62, at 196, 358 P.2d at 1058.
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2. Denials of Due Process
The influence of federal habeas corpus on Oregon's post-con-
viction remedies before and after the act is significant. Oregon adopted
the expanded view of habeas corpus in Huffman v. Alexander7 largely
as a result of similar action by Congress and the United States Su-
preme Court.8 Since Brooks 9 is the leading case interpreting the
grounds for relief under the act, it is important to list some of the
grounds considered to constitute a denial of due process. This is not
to say, of course, that all of these grounds in Oregon would constitute
that State's idea of constitutional violations under either the Oregon
Constitution or the United States Constitution, but they are a pretty
good guide for predictions. By no means complete, these grounds are:
suppression of evidence,90 amendment of an indictment without resub-
mission to the jury,9 holding a trial under mob pressure and com-
munity coercion, 2 denial of counsel for a defendant in a noncapital
case,9 3 coerced guilty plea,9" guilty pleas obtained by trick,9" denial
of counsel after arraignment and before trial,96 use of perjured
testimony and suppression of evidence,97 conviction based upon a
coerced confession, 8 and incompetency of appointed counsel.99
Compared with these grounds are errors which the court in Brooks
cites as not amounting to a denial of due process. Those include:
imposition of sentences of fine and imprisonment as cumulative rather
than alternative as provided by statute,' introduction of incom-
87 Huffman v. Alexander, supra note 77, 251 P.2d at 100-01.
88 Ibid. See also Brooks v. Gladden, supra note 62, at 195, 358 P.2d at 1058. For a
discussion of federal approach, see Comment, 27 Ohio St. L.J. 302 (1966).
89 Supra note 62.
90 Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920).
91 Ex parte Bain, 121 US. 1 (1897).
92 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
93 Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
94 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
9 Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941); McKeag v. People, 7 In. 2d 586, 131
N.E.2d 517 (1956); People v. Evans, 412 III. 616, 107 N.E.2d 839 (1952).
96 Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945).
97 Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); People v. Wakat, 415 Il1. 610, 114 N.E.2d
706 (1953); People v. Jennings, 411 1El. 21, 102 N.E.2d 824 (1952).
98 People v. Wakat, supra note 97; People v. Evans, supra note 95; People v. Jen-
nings, supra note 97; Commonwealth ex rel. Sheeler v. Burke, 367 Pa. 152, 79 A.2d 654
(1951).
99 People v. Morris, 3 DII. 2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954). For grounds available
under the federal act, see Comment, 27 Ohio St. L.J. 321 (1966).
100 Ex parte Mooney, 26 W. Va. 36, 53 Am. Rep. 59 (1885). But see Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 138.530(c) (1963).
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petent evidence in an otherwise fair trial, 1' grand jury impaneled by
a judge not in the judicial district,0 ' lack of technical precision of
the indictment stating the crime,'O° crime charged is objectionably
indefinite,.0 4 members of the grand jury are not citizens as required by
state law,'05 erroneous denial of a tendered defense,1 6 insufficiency
of evidence'07 (as opposed to a complete absence of evidence),'O'
illegal arrest with defendant later brought before the court on proper
complaints,0 9 clerical error in the indictment charging commission
of the crimes six months after trial,110 and indictment defective in
charging an offense under the habitual criminal statutes."'
Cases explicitly or implicitly using the test in Brooks as a present
guide in determining what constitutes grounds for relief under sub-
sections 138.530(1) (a) and (b) have considered the following grounds
to be cognizable: ability of the prosecutor to choose between prosecu-
tion of a crime as either a felony or a misdemeanor for the same act,"
petitioner mentally incompetent to stand trial,"' discriminatory ap-
plication of habitual criminal statute,114 double jeopardy,115 systematic
and intentional exclusion of petitioner's race from the grand and petit
juries,"16 and failure of an indictment to allege any crime.117
101 Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131 (1924).
102 Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U.S. 442 (1910).
103 Dimmick v. Tompkins, 194 U.S. 540 (1904).
104 Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420 (1912).
105 Kaizo v. Henry, 211 U.S. 146 (1908).
106 Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947).
107 Ex parte Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709, 177 P.2d 918 (1947); Commonwealth ex rel.
Jackson v. Day, 179 Pa. Super. 566, 118 A.2d 289 (1955).
108 Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
109 Ex Parte Olsen, 74 Idaho 400, 263 P.2d 388 (1953).
110 Shaw v. Utcht, 232 Minn. 82, 43 N.W.2d 781 (1950).
Ill Harrod v. Whaley, 239 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1951).
112 Liey v. Gladden, 220 Ore. 84, 348 P.2d 1 (1959), decided before Brooks, was the
first case reaching the court under the new act. See Broome v. Gladden, 231 Ore. 502,
373 P.2d 611 (1962); Seibel v. Gladden, 220 Ore. 147, 348 P.2d 1120 (1960). Although
these cases were brought under subsection (1) (c) of Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.530 (1963)
instead of subsections (1) (a) and (1) (b) they hold that this ground is considered in
Oregon to be a violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause because
it permits a prosecutor to discriminate between two defendants who have committed the
same act for which one could be tried for a felony and the other a misdemeanor. See also
State v. Powell, 212 Ore. 684, 321 P.2d 333 (1958), which holds this to be a violation of
the Ore. Const. art. I, § 20.
113 Syphers v. Gladden, 230 Ore. 148, 368 P.2d 942 (1962).
114 Bailleaux v. Gladden, 230 Ore. 606, 370 P.2d 722 (1962).
115 Ibid.
116 Anderson v. Gladden, 234 Ore. 614, 383 P.2d 986 (1963).
117 Barnett v. Gladden, 237 Ore. 76, 390 P.2d 614 (1964).
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The following are some of the grounds asserted in post-conviction
proceedings which were considered as constituting less than a denial
of due process: failure to comply with a criminal procedural statute
such as (1) charging the principal crime and the habitual criminal
statute in one information," 8 (2) failure to file or to furnish the
defendant with a copy of the psychiatric report made after conviction
but prior to sentencing,"' (3) failure to hold a presentence hearing on
the psychiatric report, 20 (4) denial of a preliminary hearing when
there exists a valid indictment,121 or (5) denial of the statutory right
to poll a jury; 122 failure of an information or indictment to state
facts sufficient to constitute a crime; 123 hearsay assertions of a prose-
cutor that defendant has previous convictions; 124 new or additional
evidence; 12 consideration by the court of defendant's juvenile record
in imposing the sentence; 12 imposition of irregular or excessive sen-
tence; 12 use of "volunteer" jurors; 12 and conviction resulting from
mistake of fact where the proof of the jury's mistake must depend
upon the credibility of newly discovered evidence. 29
Note that the above list is restricted to cases dealing with sub-
sections 138.530(1)(a) and (b), best described as the expanded
habeas corpus sections, and do not include grounds which have been
raised but not considered by the court because of res judicata or waiver.
Neither does the list represent an exhaustive categorization of grounds
cognizable under pre-1959 habeas corpus. Nevertheless, it should be
quite apparent by now that subsections 138.530(1) (a) and (b) of Ore-
118 Tuel v. Gladden, 234 Ore. 1, 379 P.2d 553 (1963), citing Smallman v. Gladden,
supra note 79.
119 Kloss v. Gladden, 233 Ore. 98, 377 P.2d 146 (1962); Syphers v. Gladden, supra
note 113.
120 Kloss v. Gladden, supra note 119; Enyart v. Gladden, 233 Ore. 37, 377 P.2d 25
(1962).
121 Anderson v. Gladden, 234 Ore. 614, 383 P.2d 986 (1963), citing Anderson ex rel.
Poe v. Gladden, 205 Ore. 538, 280 P.2d 823 (1955).
122 Brooks v. Gladden, 226 Ore. 191, 358 P.2d 1055 (1961).
123 Barnett v. Gladden, supra note 117; Tuel v. Gladden, 234 Ore. 1, 379 P.2d 553
(1963) ; State v. Cloran, 233 Ore. 400, 377 P.2d 911 (1963).
124 Spencer v. Gladden, 228 Ore. 522, 365 P.2d 621 (1961).
125 Freeman v. Gladden, 236 Ore. 137, 387 P.2d 360 (1963).
126 Mitchell v. Gladden, 229 Ore. 192, 366 P.2d 907 (1961).
127 Founts v. Gladden, 237 Ore. 473, 391 P.2d 629 (1964); State v. Cloran, supra
note 123; Bryant v. State, 233 Ore. 459, 378 P.2d 951 (1963) ; Landreth v. Gladden, 213
Ore. 205, 324 P.2d 475 (1958); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Ore. 629, 281 P.2d 233 (1955);
Little v. Gladden, 202 Ore. 16, 273 P.2d 443 (1954).
128 Anderson v. Gladden, supra note 121, citing Garner v. Alexander, 167 Ore. 670,
120 P.2d 238 (1941).
129 Anderson v. Gladden, supra note 121.
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gon's Post-Conviction Hearing Act exist to determine if petitioner's
rights under the fourteenth amendment and the Oregon Constitution
have been violated. Brooks v. Gladden30 (as well as the development of
habeas corpus in Oregon) leaves no doubt that what constitutes a denial
of an accused's right to due process under either federal or state con-
stitutions as a ground for relief under the act, will be determined
largely by the rulings of the United States Supreme Court and Oregon's
willingness to follow them. 131 Although the significance of the fact
may be illusory, it is nevertheless interesting to note that the writer
has been unable to find one case decided under the act in which the
United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari.
3. Other Grounds
The previous discussion has centered around only the first two
of the four grounds for relief provided in subsection 138.530(1). The
third (the second most important ground from the petitioner's point
of view) is contained in subsection (c) as follows:
Sentence in excess of, or otherwise not in accordance with, the
sentence authorized by law for the crime of which petitioner was
convicted; or the unconstitutionality of such sentence.132
A significant difference between subsection (c) and the expanded
habeas corpus subsections (a) and (b) should be kept in mind. An
action brought under (c) is an attack on the sentence imposed after
conviction and is strictly limited to just that. Irrespective of the in-
validity of the sentence, the judgment of conviction is not affected and
its validity is not questioned. In State v. Cloran,3 3 the petitioner suc-
cessfully attacked his habitual criminal conviction' 34 and won because
the trial court had erroneously considered a federal conviction. The
petitioner was remanded to the trial court for resentencing on the
principal crime of perjury. 35 Petitioner made and was granted a mo-
tion for arrest of judgment on the ground the indictment failed to state
13o Supra note 122.
131 Brooks v. Gladden, supra note 122, at 200, 358 P.2d at 1060.
Although this court's application of the standard of due process in a par-
ticular case may be at variance with that of the Supreme Court of the United
States, the standard itself is the same.
132 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.530(1) (c) (1963).
133 Supra note 123.
134 An habitual criminal sentence is imposed as part of the sentence for the principal
crime. Smallman v. Gladden, 206 Ore. 262, 291 P.2d 749 (1956). Being an habitual
criminal is not a crime. State v. Little, 205 Ore. 659, 288 P.2d 446, rehearing denied, 290
P.2d 802 (1955).
135 Ibid.
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a crime in the trial court after remand. On appeal by the State, the
Supreme Court of Oregon reversed the trial court and made explicit
that this section was not available to question the soundness of the
judgment of conviction on any ground or to circumvent the time limit
imposed upon the availability of a motion to arrest judgment. Further,
on remand, the trial court could entertain no further proceedings
and had no choice but to resentence the petitioner. 136
A further significant difference between the expanded habeas
corpus subsections (a) and (b) and subsection (c) centers around the
important distinction between error and a denial of due process, error
not being grounds for relief under the former two subsections. Some
of the errors not amounting to a denial of due process were listed at
the close of the discussion of subsections (a) and (b).' That list
included the failure to file or to furnish defendant a copy of the report
of psychiatric examination made after conviction but prior to sentenc-
ing,1 38 or failure to hold a presentencing hearing on the psychiatric
report. 39 Nevertheless, these latter two errors are grounds for relief
under subsection (c).
In Bloor v. Gladden,'40 one of the grounds alleged by the peti-
tioner in the trial court was a denial of his right to be furnished a
copy of the psychiatric report made after he was convicted of the
statutory rape of his thirteen year old daughter and given a twenty-
year sentence. 4' The trial court granted relief on this issue and re-
manded petitioner to the convicting court for resentencing. On appeal
the trial court was affirmed. Consequently, subsection (c) must be
viewed as allowing the denial of some statutory procedural rights
after conviction and prior to sentencing to be raised in a post-convic-
tion hearing under the act.
This interpretation of subsection (c) is supported by the fact that
the same section lists an unconstitutional sentence in addition to exces-
sive and unauthorized sentences as one which may be attacked. A later
case, Kloss v. Gladden,'42 at first glance would seem to weaken this
136 See also cases cited at supra note 127.
137 See text accompanying notes 118-129 sura.
138 See cases cited at sura note 119.
139 See cases cited at supra note 120.
140 227 Ore. 600, 363 P.2d 57 (1961).
141 Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 137.111-.117 (1963) relate to sexual psychopaths and provide
that after conviction of sex crime, that a psychiatric examination be given the defendant,
that a report thereof be furnished him, and that a copy of the report be filed with the
court. A presentencing hearing is to be then held to determine whether or not the court
will impose an indeterminate life sentence.
142 Supra note 119.
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interpretation. However, Koss did not overrule Bloor and the facts
in the two cases are almost identical. In Koss the defendant was con-
victed of the rape of a thirteen year old girl. After conviction, however,
Koss was not given a psychiatric examination, a report thereof, or a
presentencing hearing, but was immediately sentenced to a term of
years. Koss petitioned for post-conviction relief citing these errors
but alleging a "substantial denial" of due process under subsection
138.530(1) (a) instead of subsection (c). The court, relying on Town-
send v. Burke 4' for the proposition that due process requires less in
post-conviction proceedings than it does in pretrial and trial proceed-
ings, held that Kloss had suffered no denial of due process because the
trial court could have imposed a greater sentence, i.e, indeterminate
life, and the court therefore reimposed the original sentence. It would
appear, since Bloor was not overruled by Koss, the difference between
the two lies in the method of pleading.144 If the denial of rights under
statutory psychiatric examination procedures are pleaded as error,
instead of constitutional violations, relief may be available. However,
practically speaking, a defendant would not raise this error if he could
get indeterminate life instead of a definite term of years, especially
since any invalidity of the sentence does not affect the conviction.
Subsection (c) provides three types of defective sentences which
are vulnerable to attack under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The
first is a sentence in excess of that authorized by statute. This is, of
course, the subpart on which the recidivist relies. The second type
of defective sentence is one otherwise not in accordance with law.
Although most sentences which have been assailed under subsection
(c) are ultimately asserted to be excessive sentences, the same cases
seem to indicate that a petitioner can get to an excessive sentence
through the back door. 45
143 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
144 See Koss v. Gladden, supra note 119; Enyart v. Gladden, supra note 120.
145 In Mitchell v. Gladden, supra note 126, the trial court imposed a sentence of
"a term of five years in the Oregon State Penitentiary," instead of an indeterminate
period of time with a specific maximum term as required by statute. The Supreme Court
of Oregon denied relief by indulging in a presumption in favor of the trial court by
which it read the sentence in reverse of the reading given it by the petitioner-the
specified time of five years indicated the maximum term and the indeterminate term was
implied. In Bryant v. State, 233 Ore. 459, 378 P.2d 951 (1963), petitioner sought relief
under this subsection because he was not sentenced until three years and ten months
after his conviction. Bryant had been put on probation in lieu of sentencing, during which
time he absconded. On his capture and return he was sentenced to the full five years.
He unsuccessfully claimed that since he was on probation for over three years, the court
was not authorized to impose the full five-year term. Indicating that an accused could
attack his sentence because the prosecutor had the choice of prosecuting under either a
felony or misdemeanor statute, the court in Broome v. Gladden, 231 Ore. 502, 373 P.2d
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The significant differences between the subsections indicate the
possibility of an attack on consecutive and concurrent sentences on
grounds listed in subsection (c) since the ability of a petitioner to
attack errors in his sentence under subsection (c) may not amount to
a denial of due process. Although this question has not been presented
to the Supreme Court of Oregon, the extended scope of post-conviction
relief provided by subsection (c) would probably allow a petitioner to
attack such sentences since it covers excessive and otherwise irregular
sentences. Traditionally, habeas corpus was limited to an attack on
the validity of the restraint. If a recidivist may attack a previous
conviction for which the sentence imposed has been served, 4 ' it is
equally probable a convict will be able to attack a concurrent or con-
secutive sentence even though success in such an action may not
directly affect his imprisonment.147 Notwithstanding the fact that
parole or conditional pardon are available, an irregular consecutive
sentence would undoubtedly adversely affect a person's chance for
parole. Further, consecutive sentences are imposed under statutory
authority 4 ' and subsection (c) specifically permits an attack on
sentences not imposed in accordance with law. If a person could
successfully attack a concurrent or consecutive sentence, relief is
available. Section 138.520 expressly provides for modification of
sentence as well as "such other relief as may be proper and just." The
final ground for attacking the sentence is its unconstitutionality. Ore-
gon's habitual criminal statutes have been assailed on this ground.149
611 (1962), never decided the question. Rather, the court construed the two statutes
involved to be mutually exclusive and determined that petitioner had been tried under
the proper statute. A case in which it is alleged the trial judge considered incompetent
evidence in imposing the sentence would also be included under this category because
of its error quality.
140 See text accompanying note 58 supra.
'47 See Collins & Neil at 342.
148 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 137.120 (1963).
149 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138X20 (1963). If we follow the logic of expanded habeas
corpus, an otherwise valid sentence could become unconstitutional because the trial judge
was prejudiced when imposing the sentence. This question has been presented to the
Supreme Court of Oregon but not decided because the petitioner failed to sustain his
burden of proof. Barber v. Gladden, 215 Ore. 129, 332 P.2d 641 (1958). However, Oregon's
habitual criminal statutes have been upheld as constitutional, Hirte v. Gladden, 235 Ore.
45, 383 P.2d 993 (1963); Tuel v. Gladden, supra note 118. In Tuel v. Gladden, the peti-
tioner contended his habitual criminal sentence was invalid as a result of the unconsti-
tutionality of the habitual criminal statutes under the Oregon Constitution. The latter
requires that punishment for a crime be based on reformative rather than vindictive
justice. Ore. Const. art. I, § 15. Tuel argued that reformation implied eventual release
from imprisonment and consequently, a life sentence without parole was not reformative
but vindicative. Although implicitly agreeing with his argument, the court said the
contemplated release was not to be at the substantial risk of the public. By tacking this
1966]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
IV. CONCEPTS OF FINALITY AND FAnNEss
A. Res Judicata
The rising tide of post-conviction proceedings and the inadequacy
of previous common law remedies have necessitated statutory remedies
such as the Oregon act. However, the availability of such remedies
and the concurrent availability of federal habeas corpus have deluged
the courts with petitions for post-conviction relief. Further, this situ-
ation has nearly erased any finality once attributable to the state's
criminal process, virtually making the state appellate and post-con-
viction procedures mere steps to go through to get to the federal
district courts. Recent years have seen a sharp increase in the number
of habeas corpus petitions many of which were obviously frivolous.
It was not until relatively recent times that Oregon applied res judicata
doctrines to habeas corpus in an effort to stem the burdening in-
crease.150 Oregon has provided an adequately broad post-conviction
remedy, sufficiently open-ended to review any claims that a petitioner
may have which would be considered grounds for relief in accordance
with the dictates of the Supreme Court of the United States. As Case
v. Nebraska'5" indicated, the goal of a post-conviction statute must be
to provide constitutional fairness to the criminal process. It also
recognizes the need for an end, at the earliest possible stage, to the
criminal process. These two goals are often difficult to accommodate.
Keeping in mind the requirements of Fay v. Noia,"' a look at section
138.550, Oregon's attempt to inject finality into its criminal process,
is appropriate at this point.
Section 138.550 together with section 138.530 constitutes the
heart of Oregon's Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The latter has
furnished the requisite fairness and the former attempts to provide
the finality. Section 138.550 embodies the doctrines of res judicata
and waiver with a clear admonition to the courts that the means by
which the criminal process is brought to an end "shall be as specified
in this section and not otherwise."'" 3 The res judicata section of
exception on the Oregon Constitution they determined the probability of reforming a
four-time loser was slight enough and the possibility of risk to the community great
enough in his release to warrant life imprisonment without parole. Conviction under a
statute which is vague and indefinite is also an example of grounds for relief under
§ 138.530(1)(d). For ground for relief previously available, see State v. Dixon, 238 Ore.
121, 393 P.2d 204 (1964). See also Daughtery v. Gladden, 217 Ore. 567, 341 P.2d 1069
(1959); Macomber v. Gladden, 216 Ore. 579, 337 P.2d 971 (1959).
150 Macomber v. Gladden, supra note 149; Barber v. Gladden, supra note 149.
151 381 U.S. 336 (1965). See text accompanying note 1 supra.
152 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
153 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.550 (1963).
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Oregon's post-conviction remedy statute is extensive and comprehen-
sive. Like habeas corpus, it had become an expanded doctrine" 4 of
res judicata in its more conventional form."' Section 138.550 bars
litigation of an issue raised and one which could reasonably have been
raised at the same time. Although as a practical matter the distinction
may be meaningless, waiver implies an intentional or voluntary
relinquishment of a known right suggesting an affirmative act; for-
feiture implies the loss of a right, whether known or not, by failure to
act or to enforce it. Whether or not justifiable, this distinction is here
employed to provide a delineation between the statute's res judicata
sections and the judicial doctrine of waiver.
The statute gives a petitioner one chance to raise any claims for
relief he may have; the failure to take full advantage of this op-
portunity results in a forfeiture of his right to present additional claims
for relief, with some exceptions. Oregon's statutory use of res judicata
and judicial use of waiver appear to comply quite adequately with
the federal standards set forth in Henry v. Mississippi5 ' and Fay v.
Noia. 57
The legal machinations of an explosive burglar named Barber
have played no small part in res judicata provisions of the present act.
The Supreme Court of Oregon in deciding Barber's case' delineated
the res judicata rules now incorporated in section 138.550. Relying
on section 34.710 which states: "No question once finally determined
upon a proceeding by habeas corpus shall be reexamined upon another
proceeding of the same kind," the court decided res judicata applied
to habeas corpus. Then the court defined res judicata as meaning that
a denial of an application for habeas corpus relief was to act as a bar
to subsequent applications upon grounds which were alleged as well as
grounds which could have been alleged in the first application. The
court did not stop there, however. Seizing upon a provision in the
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act,15 9 it engrafted an exception
to this expression of res judicata. The exception provided that any
ground alleged which could not reasonably have been raised in the
prior proceeding would not be barred from consideration by res
judicata if the petitioner could establish in fact that it could not
reasonably have been raised.
1G Barber v. Gladden, supra note 149.
156 Ibid.
156 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
157 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
158 Barber v. Gladden, 215 Ore. 129, 332 P.2d 641 (1958).
159 Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act § 8.
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Subsection 138.550(1) states that the failure of a defendant to
have sought appellate review of his conviction or to have raised matters
alleged in his petition at his trial does not affect the availability of
relief under the act. Constitutional errors and irregularities in the
sentence are not forfeited by the failure to object and preserve the
constitutional error or to take a direct appeal from the conviction.
Several habeas corpus cases prior to 1959 had held that failure to
appeal or failure to raise an issue on appeal precluded any post-convic-
tion relief.10 In all of these cases, however, the court went on to
decide them on their merits. The cases invariably presented matters
of constitutional dimensions. When the petitioner's claims were
meritorious his failure to appeal was not mentioned 161 or the questions
were of "great public importance.' 16 The failure of the Supreme
Court of Oregon to apply res judicata strictly was acknowledgment
that to do so would preclude almost every application for post-con-
viction relief under Oregon's expanded habeas corpus, no matter how
meritorious. In view of what the court actually did in these cases, the
rule must be taken to mean that nonconstitutional errors not raised
or appealed are "waived" even though they may be reversible error.
This view is consistent with the rule that habeas corpus is not a sub-
stitute for appeal or delayed appeal."-
The res judicata sections must be read as referring only to consti-
tutional errors or errors in sentencing under subsection 138.530(1) (c)
of the Oregon Revised Statutes. In fact the reference in subsection
(1) to "matters alleged in this petition" implicitly relates to the
grounds for relief listed in section 138.530.14
There is, however, a situation in which error will be reviewed by
160 Landreth v. Gladden, 213 Ore. 205, 324 P.2d 475 (1958); Barber v. Gladden,
210 Ore. 46, 309 P.2d 192 (1957); Alexander v. Gladden, 205 Ore. 375, 288 P.2d 219
(1955); Blount v. Gladden, 203 Ore. 487, 280 P.2d 414 (1955).
161 Landreth v. Gladden, supra note 160.
162 Anderson v. Britton, 212 Ore. 1, 318 P.2d 291 (1957).
163 Compare with a similar rule applied by the courts on direct appeal to the effect
that errors not raised in the trial court cannot be considered on appeal. State v. Dayton,
Ore. -, 409 P.2d 189 (1965); State v. Williams, - Ore. -, 408 P.2d 936 (1965).
164 See Parker v. Gladden, - Ore. -, 407 P.2d 246, 247 (1965), which states:
The grounds for post-conviction relief are limited. Error at the trial, even though
it be considered reversible, prejudicial, or materially affecting the rights of the
party, is not necessarily a sufficient basis upon which to grant post-conviction
relief. Post-conviction is not a delayed appeal. The basic purpose of the Act was
not to enlarge the grounds for post-conviction relief; it was to end the confusion
over which of the common-law writs was the proper vehicle to seek relief by
providing a single exclusive remedy.
See also State v. Cloran, supra note 123; Brooks v. Gladden, supra note 122.
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the court in a post-conviction proceeding when no appeal was taken.
In Bevel v. Gladden6' the petitioner alleged a denial of his constitu-
tional rights under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment in that he was denied his statutory right of direct appeal be-
cause he could not afford to procure a transcript of his trial. In
response to Griffin v. Illinois'66 the court was forced to grant relief.
Since the transcript was before it, the court simply proceeded to review
it as if the proceeding were a direct and timely appeal and considered
both error and constitutional irregularities. Practically speaking, of
course, this amounted to delayed appeal. No doubt this procedure will
be strictly limited in the future to just such a situation, but it is never-
theless justified under the act permitting courts to "grant such other
relief as may be proper and just." 67
Subsection 138.550(1) reiterates the exhaustion requirement
which bars post-conviction relief while direct appeal, a motion for new
trial, or a motion in arrest of judgment are still available. This exhaus-
tion requirement is similar to that required in federal habeas corpus
as interpreted by Fay v. Noia.16s Failure to take advantage of these
post-conviction procedures does not bar post-conviction relief.169
The remaining res judicata sections substantially adopt the doc-
trine of Barber v. Gladden'7" with some ameliorating exceptions. A
rule different than that of subsection (1) applies under subsection (2)
when the petitioner has taken a direct appeal from his conviction. If
an appeal has been taken, subsection (2) bars an application for
relief under the act when the grounds were or could reasonably have
been raised.' 7' Subsection (3) similarly applies res judicata to a prior
proceeding under the act and subsection (4) similarly applies it to
post-conviction proceedings instituted prior to the effective date of the
act, i.e., habeas corpus, coram nobis, and motions to correct the
record or to vacate the judgment. The statute does not give any guide
for determining when a ground could reasonably have been asserted
in a prior proceeding. Barber v. Gladden'72 does, however, indicate the
165 232 Ore. 578, 583-85, 376 P.2d 117, 119-20 (1962).
166 351 US. 12 (1956).
167 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.520 (1963).
168 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
169 Barnett v. Gladden, 237 Ore. 76, 390 P.2d 614 (1964); Brooks v. Gladden,
supra note 122.
170 215 Ore. 129, 332 P.2d 641 (1958).
171 See, e.g., Benson v. Gladden, - Ore. -, 407 P.2d 634 (1965). The Oregon
court made an exception to this rule in Anderson v. Gladden, 234 Ore. 614, 383 P.2d 986
(1963), because the issues were of "great public importance."
172 Supra note 170.
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court is not about to suggest situations in which res judicata will not
bar an application for relief because the ground could not reasonably
have been raised in a prior proceeding. Instead, the court simply
states that it is up to the petitioner to establish that the grounds
asserted could not have reasonably been assigned on appeal or asserted
in a prior post-conviction proceeding.'73
In addition to the exception announced in Barber v. Gladden,'74
and embodied in the present act, section 138.550 provides an additional
exception to the application of res judicata if the petitioner alleges
a ground for relief under the act which was not specifically decided
by the court on a prior appeal or prior post-conviction proceeding and
the petitioner was not represented by counsel.17 If the court previously
173 Jensen v. Gladden, 233 Ore. 439, 378 P.2d 950 (1963); Poe v. Gladden, 233
Ore. 324, 378 P.2d 276 (1963). If the Oregon court has not elaborated on the exception
up to this point, the federal district courts have. In Macomber v. Gladden, 304 F.2d 487
(9th Cir. 1962), a dismissal of the habeas corpus was affirmed because petitioner had
failed to exhaust his state remedies. Petitioner had applied for habeas corpus, in the state
courts three different times. However, the first two petitions were presented prior to
Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Ore. 283, 251 P.2d 87, rehearing denied, 253 P.2d 289 (1953),
when habeas corpus relief was strictly limited to person or subject matter jurisdiction
questions. The grounds alleged in the district court could not have reasonably been
asserted at that time since they were not claims which went to these questions. Macomber's
third habeas corpus petition in the state courts was denied because of res judicata of the
first two. The federal district court saw this as a situation in which the ground presently
asserted could not reasonably have been asserted in any prior proceeding. It was not until
1964 that the Supreme Court of Oregon provided an example of this exception to res
judicata in Freeman v. Gladden, 239 Ore. 144, 396 P.2d 779 (1964). The court had pre-
viously denied relief in a post-conviction proceeding, Freeman v. Gladden, 236 Ore. 137,
138-39, 387 P.2d 360, 361 (1963), because the grounds set forth in the petition had been
asserted on direct appeal from the conviction. Petitioner's conviction was affirmed in
State v. Freeman, 232 Ore. 267, 374 P.2d 453 (1962) ; cert. denied, 373 U.S. 919, rehearing
denied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963). Petitioner had asserted that her constitutional rights had
been violated by a denial of counsel during an intense interrogation before arraignment
during which she made statements incriminating herself. In the present case, the court
reconsidered petitioner's allegation of denial of counsel on a motion to recall the man-
date entered in the first post-conviction proceeding in light of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964), decided after its mandate had issued. Although the court decided that
the merits did not warrant application of .Escobedo, it is nevertheless an example of a
situation in which the ground, although asserted previously, could not reasonably have
been asserted on the same basis as it could after Escobedo. Delaney v. Gladden, 237
F. Supp. 1010 (D. Ore. 1965) was a similar case. Petitioner had alleged a denial of
counsel during the interrogation and since his previous petitions for post-conviction
relief in the state courts were before Escobedo, the district court decided this ground
could not have reasonably been raised and consequently dismissed for failure to exhaust
the available state court remedies.
174 228 Ore. 140, 363 P.2d 771 (1961).
'75 Hirte v. Gladden, 235 Ore. 45, 383 P.2d 993 (1963); Delaney v. Gladden, 232
Ore. 306, 374 P.2d 746 (1962); Barber v. Gladden, supra note 174.
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determined the question on the merits, whether or not the petitioner
had counsel is irrelevant. It is only when petitioner had no counsel in
the prior proceeding and the ground alleged was not specifically
decided by the court.
The fact that subsection 138.550(4) applies res judicata to pre-
vious post-conviction proceedings prior to 1959 anticipates other prob-
lems which were implicit in the confusion of remedies then available.
Although petitioner had previously raised and the court had adversely
decided a ground for relief now raisable under the act, such ground
could be raised once again under the act, if the prior adverse decision
was based on the fact that "no remedy heretofore existing allowed
relief upon the ground alleged."' 76 Hope has been expressed that the
courts will give this exception a liberal interpretation so as to cover
the situation in which the petitioner simply chose the wrong remedy. 77
One further exception to the application of res judicata to post-
conviction proceedings prior to 1959 under subsection (4) permits a
petitioner to bring an action under the act if an adverse decision in
a prior post-conviction proceeding rested upon petitioner's inability to
sustain his burden of proof without contradicting the record of the
trial court. Such had not been possible in a habeas corpus action. 8
It is here appropriate to mention that section 138.630 provides for
contradiction of the record. However, it will be remembered that in
habeas corpus there is an irrebuttable presumption of the veracity of
the record which can not be directly contradicted.'79 This section did
176 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.550(4) (1963).
177 Collins & Neil at 341-43. Although the Supreme Court of Oregon has never de-
cided this question, the federal courts have. In Alcorn v. Gladden, 286 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.
1961), the court of appeals affirmed the district court's order remanding the petitioner
to his state remedies because of his failure to exhaust them. Petitioner had alleged a
denial of counsel and the entry of a coerced guilty plea in an application for relief by
way of coram nobis. Coram nobis was not the appropriate remedy for relief on these
grounds because they were cognizable on habeas corpus. Consequently, relief was denied
in the Oregon courts not because petitioner had no remedy at all but because he chose
the wrong one. In remanding petitioner to his state remedies, the district court and the
court of appeals implicitly interpreted subsection (4) to encompass such a situation
even though a strict reading of that subsection would not so indicate. It no doubt may
be safely assumed that the Supreme Court of Oregon will do the same should the question
ever be presented. As a matter of fact, Alcorn subsequently filed a petition under the
act alleging the same grounds for relief which he had alleged in federal court and was
heard on the merits. Alcorn v. Gladden, 237 Ore. 106, 111-12, 390 P.2d 625, 628 (1964).
This can be taken as an implicit approval of the interpretation imposed on this excep-
tion by the federal courts.
178 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
179 Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Ore. 283, 251 P.2d 87 (1952), rehearing denied, 253
P.2d 289 (1953). Note, however, that evidence tending to invalidate, but not directly
contradicting, recitals in the record can be introduced.
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not completely wipe out the presumption. Womack v. Kremen,1 80
denied relief because petitioner had not sustained his burden of proof' 81
which the court made greater by imposing a presumption of the truth
of the facts recited in the trial record. Although subsection 138.620(2)
requires proof of petitioner's allegations by a preponderance of the
evidence and section 138.630 says nothing of any presumption in favor
of the trial record, the court retained the presumption with the result
that the act simply changed the presumption from being absolute
to rebuttable. The effect of this presumption is to impose a greater
burden of proof when the issue raised is one of fact as opposed to one
of law. However, compared to pre-1959 habeas corpus, the Post-Con-
viction Hearing Act does permit an issue of fact to be raised if not
otherwise precluded by the res judicata provisions.
B. Waiver
The real scope of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act cannot be
appreciated without a look at Oregon's judicial doctrine of waiver. It
is therefor appropriate to discuss this doctrine as an adjunct to the
res judicata provisions. Again, it is well to keep in mind the implicit
federal requirements that a strict employment of waiver in favor of
the petitioner is greatly favored and that any waiver of a constitutional
right must be an intelligent, understanding, and intentional relinquish-
ment of a known right. 8
'Oregon's use of waiver is best seen through cases involving guilty
pleas, a subject on which the post-conviction remedy statute is silent.
A conviction on a plea of guilty may be assaulted in a post-conviction
proceeding under the act. 83 Huffman v. Alexander" held that habeas
corpus prior to 1959 was available to attack a guilty plea even though
such an attack was strictly limited because of the rule against con-
tradicting the record. This limitation is greatly eased under the statute
but not completely erased. A guilty plea is a judicial confession which
waives all defenses and objections both in the nature of error and
of a constitutional dimension. 85 In Huffman it was recognized that for
a waiver to be valid,
180 234 Ore. 170, 173, 380 P.2d 815, 816 (1963).
181 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.620(2) (1963).
182 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
183 Alcorn v. Gladden, 237 Ore. 106, 116-19, 390 P.2d 625, 630-32 (1965).
184 197 Ore. 283, 251 P.2d 87, rehearing denied, 253 P.2d 289 (1953).
185 Huffman v. Alexander, supra note 184, at 298, 251 P.2d at 93-94. See also
McWilliams v. Gladden, - Ore. -, 407 P.2d 833 (1965), where the court stated a de-
fendant's effective waiver must be based on a mental capacity of a defendant to under-
stand his rights and the meaning of waiver fully and that the choice must be free and
voluntary.
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it must be voluntary and must be understandingly made with
knowledge by the party of his rights. In this connection the age,
education, experience, mental capacity, the nature of the charge,
whether complicated or simple, the possible defenses available and
other relevant circumstances will be considered if the case be taken
to federal court and should be considered in the state court if con-
flicts and intolerable delays are to be avoided.'8 6
This case also states that a hearing should be held by the trial
court relative to the validity of the guilty plea. 87 This standard of
waiver and the necessity to hold an evidentiary hearing complies
adequately with the federal constitutional standards. However, state-
ment of the standard and its application are two different matters.
Most cases decided under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act involving
waiver questions acknowledge that any waiver must be made under-
standingly and intentionally with a knowledge of rights available.
However there appears to be no case since Huffman reciting what is to
be considered in determining if the waiver was intelligently and under-
standingly made. Since no lower state court decisions are reported in
Oregon, it is difficult to be sure just what the lower courts considered,
and the Supreme Court of Oregon does not very often elaborate upon
what facts appear in the record before it. Assuming the indices of an
intelligent and knowing waiver listed in Huffman are still the guide,
Oregon cases involving waiver pose some problems. Are the standards
of Huffman being used? Are the standards less strict when the peti-
tioner had been represented by counsel at his trial? Is the burden
upon the petitioner or the respondent in a post-conviction proceeding
involving waiver and what problem does Townsend v. Sain pose,88
if any?
In light of Gideon v. Wainwright,8 9 Townsend v. Sain,19 0 and
186 Huffman v. Alexander, supra note 184, at 322, 251 P.2d at 104.
187 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.620 (1963) provides for a mandatory evidentiary hearing.
188 372 U.S. 293 (1963). In Admire v. Gladden, 227 Ore. 370, 362 P.2d 380 (1961),
the petitioner had confessed to statutory rape while in the county jail on another charge.
Thereafter, an arrest warrant was issued and a preliminary hearing held. At the hearing
the record merely reflected that petitioner had been advised of the nature of the charge,
that he declined appointment of counsel and that he entered a guilty plea. The record
did not show that advice as to the right to counsel or the meaning of a guilty plea was
given. The psychiatric report subsequently filed showed that petitioner was 31 years
old, white, male of low average intelligence with a poor work record, and was divorced.
He had been given a medical discharge from the army, suffered from alcoholism, was
emotionally immature and irresponsible, and had had previous difficulty with the law.
Post-conviction relief was denied because petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof
that he had been denied his right to counsel, that there was no effective waiver of in-
dictment, and that his guilty plea was involuntary. There was nothing in the record
to indicate that he had not understood the trial proceedings or was not fully advised
1966]
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Case v. Nebraska,191 it would seem that the trial record should affirma-
tively show that any waiver is the result of an intelligent and voluntary
relinquishment of the right in question and that the burden of showing
the same is upon the state. If the record does not affirmatively support
petitioner's allegations, it should be presumed that he was properly
advised and that the waiver was valid. Again, if this is true, it is
another reason why the effectiveness of the statute in providing finality
and fairness to the state criminal process may be weakened by the
Oregon judiciary."0 2
of his rights or that he did not act in accordance with his own best judgment. Bloor v.
Gladden, 227 Ore. 600, 363 P.2d 57 (1961), was almost an exact replica of Admire al-
though we do not know what the psychiatric report contained. Post-conviction relief
was also denied in this case, but in Bloor the Supreme Court of Oregon did not have the
trial judge's findings of fact to determine upon what basis the trial court had found that
petitioner had not maintained his burden of proof. Both of these cases throw serious
doubt upon whether or not the Oregon courts are following the standards announced in
Huffman. Alcorn v. Gladden, 237 Ore. 106, 113-15, 390 P.2d 625, 629-30 (1964), in-
volved an allegation of denial of counsel. At the post-conviction hearing the trial judge
testified he had advised the defendant of his right to counsel and had offered to appoint
one. Relief was denied because petitioner was deemed to have waived counsel but nothing
was said relevant to whether or not the waiver was an intelligent and understanding
waiver. It appears the trial court's finding of an understanding waiver was based on the
fact the trial judge had advised petitioner of his right to counsel and had offered to
appoint one. Whether the waiver standards of Huffman are being applied cannot be
definitely answered on the basis of these cases. If Huffman is not being applied, it could
very well mean that the fairness and finality of an adequate post-conviction remedy
statute will be weakened by the improper use of a waiver doctrine.
In Barber v. Gladden, 228 Ore. 140, 142-43, 363 P.2d 771, 773 (1961), petitioner
alleged that the trial judge was prejudiced in passing sentence after a plea of guilty. Be-
cause petitioner was represented by counsel, no objection to the evidence was made, and
neither the petitioner nor his attorney made a request for the trial court to consider evi-
dence in extenuation or mitigation of the sentence. Petitioner was deemed to have waived
any possible prejudice of the judge. It does not appear that most of the requirements of
an understanding waiver were even thought of let alone considered. In the recent case
of Rose v. Gladden,-Ore.-, 405 P.2d 543 (1965), petitioner alleged that his plea of
guilty was an unintelligent plea because he thought he was pleading to a misdemeanor
instead of a felony. The court denied relief because there was nothing in the record to
support this contention and because petitioner was represented by counsel at the time.
Although scant evidence thereof, these two cases indicate that presence of counsel may
supply the basis for presuming that the petitioner understandingly and knowingly
waived his rights.
189 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
190 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
191 381 US. 336 (1965).
192 State v. Turner,-Ores, -, 404 P.2d 187, 188 (1965), shows that the Oregon
courts may be reversing a possible trend toward too lax an application of the waiver
doctrine. That case held it necessary for the police to inform an accused of his right
to remain silent and his right to counsel and that the burden of showing the effectiveness
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Waiver for failure to appeal does not bar application for relief
under the act. However, failure to appeal may be deemed a waiver
of the constitutional claims asserted in a petition under the act. 193 But
any such waiver must be intelligently and understandingly made.
CONCLUSION
Unquestionably, Oregon's experience with post-conviction rem-
edies, both prior and subsequent to the enactment of its new statute,
should prove valuable to the Ohio bar in anticipating and interpreting
problems that will arise under Ohio's Post-Conviction Remedy Act. It
is clear that the Ohio act, like Oregon's, will have to be construed in
light of the minimum due process requirements established by the
Supreme Court of the United States, notwithstanding the counter-
vailing demands for finality. The problems which the Ohio courts will
face should not be unlike those that have arisen under Oregon's act.
Hence, it should be helpful to look to the Oregon decisions, as well as
to decisions in other states having similar statutes, in order to find
the bases for future Ohio court interpretations. The Supreme Court
of the United States has laid down certain guidelines that must be
adhered to; as long as the states meet these standards they will be
allowed to dictate their own approaches to the ever-increasing demand
for post-conviction relief.
William A. Greene
of the advice was upon the state. Further, Turner imposed a duty on the trial court
to hear evidence and make findings of fact on the question of whether or not an ac-
cused was effectively advised of his rights. See also State v. Neely, 239 Ore. 487, 395
P.2d 557, modified and remanded, 398 P.2d 482 (1965). State v. Ervin,-Ore.-, 406
P.2d 901 (1965), even though a case involving direct appeal, gives further hope. The
court stated the defendant must be advised of his rights by the police and an understand-
ing waiver must appear on the record. McWilliams v. Gladden,-Ore.---, 407 P.2d 833
(1965), is to the same effect and was decided under the act.
193 Richardson v. Williard,-Ore.--, 406 P.2d 156 (1965).
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